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Q How wouldyou dejne thejeld of Pragmatics today?* 
JV Pragmatics has to be defined in relation to al1 kinds of other enterprises 
within the field of Linguistics. Traditionally, Pragmatics has been conceived 
of as an additional component of a theory of Linguistics, on a par with disci- 
plines such as Phonetics, Phonology, Morphology, and Syntax. My position 
with respect to the definition of Pragmatics is that you do not get very far if you 
try to define it as an additionai component to a theory of language. The rea- 
son is that for Pragmatics you cannot identi+ a specific unit of anaiysis. This 
is something that you can do for other domains in Linguistics. Phonology, for 
example, deals with speech sounds, Morphology with the structure of words, 
and Syntax with the structure of sentences, and even for Semantics there are a 
couple of typicai units of analysis. For instance, Lexical Semantics is involved 
with words, and most other kinds of Semantics deai with structures cailed pro- 
positions. Nothing of that sort can be identified with Pragmatics. It is more 
helpful if we adopt a broader approach whereby Pragmatics is defined as the cog- 
nitive, social and cultural sudy  of language and communication.' 
Q But stillyou maintain that Pragmatics sbould remain within the domain 
of Linguistics. In the ((Handbook of Pragmatics)) you refer to thejeld as ((Linguistic 
Pragmatics)). What is actual4 intended by the notion ((Linguistic Pragmati~s»?~ 
(*) This intewiew was carried out at the IPrA Research Center at the University of Antwerp in 
February 1995. The role of IPrA and the efforts of Jef Verschueren and his associates at 
the University of Antwerp have been of primary irnportance in shaping and defending the 
multidisciplinarity of the pragrnatic enterprise. 
1. Sorne researchers adopt a more limited view of Pragmatics deterrnined by specific research 
questions. Defining the dornain of Pragmatics is not a straightfonvard task. S. Levinson 
(1983) in his classic textbook Prapatics dedicates thirty pages to discussing the rnany prag- 
matic perspectives from which language use can be studied. For example, Pragmatics 
within relevance theory is viewed as a psychological concern involving inferential com- 
putations performed over mental representations which are constrained by the cognitive 
principle of relevance. 
2. Jef Verschueren, Jan-Ola Ostman, and Jan Blomrnaert. 1995. Handbook of Pragrnatics. 
Manual. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
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JV It is called Linguistic Prapatics because it deals primarily with language 
use that involves certain cognitive processes taking place in a social world 
with a variety of cultural constraints. The idea is, instead of being a compo- 
nent for a theory of language, it would be a perspective that is being taken on 
language and the object of investigation of this perspective can be linguistic 
phenomena at any level of structure. For instance, you can approach phonolo- 
gical phenomena from a pragmatic point of view, which is something that has 
been done traditionally in studies of intonation. Most studies in intonation use 
al1 kinds of concepts that really fit into a pragmatic perspective on language. But 
that perspective has to be defined somehow. You can study linguistic phe- 
nomena at any level of structure from a pragmatic point of view, and 1 think 
it is only if you try to define the field of Pragmatics in terms of a perspective 
that you can develop some sort of coherent theory or frame of reference. 
Q I would like to take up the point you made about Prapatics as a kind of 
perspective, and ask about the kinds ofgoals one is trying to achieve by using a 
pragmatic perspective. 
JV The overridiq goal of Pragmatics is to gain an understanding of what 
you could call the meaningjul functioning of language (i.e., how cognition, 
society, and culture contribute to the way human beings use language in their 
dady lives). That already implies that the perspective 1 am talking about is a 
functional one. But you have to add a footnote to that becausefunctionalism 
is something that can have very different meanings. For instance, in the social 
sciences functionalism is very often associated with Parsons' sociology, which 
is relatively me~hanistic.~ It is in opposition to what is known as an interpre- 
tive approach in sociology. It is obvious that when 1 talk about a functional 
perspective, 1 am dealing with the meaningjul functioning of language, it is 
much more related to the interpretive kind of social science than to the work 
that is referred to as functionalism in the social sciences. 
Q Then why not call Prapatics the (cinterpretive approach)) to hnguage? 
JV There is a simple reason why. What we want to deal with is language 
in its full complexity which means that we are not only going to deal with the 
interpretation side that is involved but there is also a production side that we 
must consider. Dealing with the meanin&lfunctioningof language is, by defi- 
nition, an interdisciplinary enterprise where you have to take into account ele- 
ments of cognition, society and culture. 
Q What sorts of considerations does one need to take into account when under- 
taking research in Pragmatics fiom the point of view of speech production? 
JV: The question is a little misleading because in my view there is no such 
thing as ((doing Pragmatics from the point of view of speech production.~ Nor 
3. Talcott Parsons, a US sociologist, presented his theory of functionalism in the early fifties 
in his book Thesocialsystem. 1951. New York: The Free Press. In his view, functions serve 
as links between relatively stable structural categories. 
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can one simply 'do Pragmatics from the point of view of interpretation.' The 
essence of what 1 am trying to say is that these are not separable. Therefore, 
the types of considerations remain the same. To take a cognitive example, the 
processing involved in the production of an utterance includes what is com- 
monly referred to as audience design. This means that an utterance is partly 
shaped on the basis of assumptions about the hearer. But these assumptions 
are themselves inevitably based on earlier interpretation processes, either 
within the context of the same exchange or on other occasions (even if there has 
been no earlier interaction with the same interlocutors). Production vs. inter- 
pretation is a useful dichotomy only if one realizes how fundamentally they 
are intertwined. Going to the social side of the matter, for instance, social rela- 
tionships do not only influence what goes on in the interaction, they are also 
shaped by it. The same principle holds, by the way, for the distinction between 
cognition, society, and culture: they are also inseparable aspects of the same 
complex human reality. 
Q How is itpossible to evaluate the progress in Pgmatics fwhat  is being 
donepertains to so m a y  domains? 
JV There is an important problem of fragmentation there which does not 
necessarily have to be bad. Ultimately, the worst thing that we could do is to 
try to impose a very strict coherent theory of language. If what we are inte- 
rested in is language use in its full human complexity then it is pretty obvious 
that this is such a complex kind of phenomenon that as soon as we try to 
impose a really rigid kind of interpretation, or a really rigid theory then we 
are bound to miss ail kinds of interesting things. Al1 you can try to do is get some 
sort of coherent frame of reference with which you can start to interpret what 
people are doing in various domains that belong or are relevant to the field 
of Pragmatics and which include various points of view as well as different 
methodologies and concepts. This is a kind of richness we should try to exploit. 
The fragmentation in itself is bad only if it results in people not being able 
to understand what others are doing. 
Q Do you think it is aproblem for thejeld ofPrapatics that researchers do 
not have a set of recognized terms that everyone uses? 
JV This is an issue, but 1 think it is part of the very nature of what it means 
to be doing science. Science is a very human kind of enterprise, which develops 
in the same way as other things in human life. People rarely use their long 
term memories. Much of what we are doing now in Pragmatics is really rein- 
venting earlier work. For example, Sapir was the kind of person who was already 
saying that there is no way to r edy  understand what happens with language 
unless we abandon strict disciplinary thinking.* As long as linguists just want 
4. Edward Sapir (1984-1939) was a US anthropological linguist. His writings (except for 
Language) are collected in a volume edited by D. Mandelbaum. 1949. Selected writings of 
Edward Sapir. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
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to be linguists they will never understand what language is about. That is a 
perspective that Sapir was already taking. These are the kinds of issues the 
implications of which people are beginning to rediscover at this moment. 
There is no linear progression in scientific affairs. There never has been 
In more recent history you can see that with reference to enterprises such 
as Speech Act t h e ~ r ~ . ~  Already in the seventies the theory was criticized for 
trying to isolate individual speech acts that were identified with various func- 
tions. These criticisms were justified. But the result has been, for instance, that 
al1 notions belonging to Speech Act theory are virtually taboo in new tradi- 
tions within the pragmatic approach to language, and as a result of that many 
things have been lost. Researchers turned to conversation as a topic in its own 
right. But when you analyze a conversation you cannot avoid certain types of 
concepts that Speech Act theory was already dealing with and had sensible 
things to say about. So we should consider preserving more of what people 
have been doing. 
There are various ways of salvaging what Speech Act theory had to offer 
by redefining both goals and methodologies. The goal of Speech Act theory 
in the orthodox Searlean version was to give a universally valid description of 
forms of human behavior. This has been heavily criticized from the point of view 
of linguistic anthropologists. There are al1 those societies where we know that 
the notion of commissives is hardly rele~ant.~There are many data which point 
in the same direction and show that it is presumptuous to think that we can 
really develop a theory of universal validity from our own point of view. That 
is a kind of goal you can simply abandon. Along the sarne line of thinking was 
the idea that speech acts did not have anything to do with the words that we 
use to describe them. These were seen as accidental language-specific things, that 
were not very relevant in their own right. That attitude should also be ques- 
tioned. But this takes us to a broader view of what it means to behave socially. 
There is no way of understandiq forms of social behavior (and that is some- 
thing we should have learned from Winch), without also understanding the 
kinds of concepts in terms of which the people engaged in a form of behavior 
interpret that behavior them~elves.~ Social behavior is always interpreted be- 
havior, so you have to understand the concepts that serve the purpose of this 
interpretation, including the lexical reflections in these concepts. Looking 
at verbal behavior from that point of view it is very relevant to start studying 
speech act verbs. You have to reinterpret the goals, then you go back to what 
people in Speech Act theory were doing and you see that much of what has 
been done becomes relevant again. Searle's analysis of promises no doubt comes 
5. Speech act theory seeks to account for the role of utterances benveen speaker and hearer. 
It is a theory which is concerned with communicating activity defined in reference to the 
speaker's intentions and the effects shelhe achieves on the listener. 
6 .  A commissive in speech act theory is a type of utterance where the speaker comrnits him- 
selflherself to a future course of action (e.g., 1 promise). 
7. Peter Winch. 1958. Tbe idea of a social science and its relation to philosopby. London: 
Routledge. 
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very close to the prototypical case of a concept lexicalized in English with the 
verb to promise. Thus, the analysis acquires a different kind of relevante than 
what it was intended as, but it is still valid. We should at least make an effort 
to try to preserve some of these contributions. 
Q Going back to this defZnition of Pragmatics as the study of the ((meaning- 
f i l f i n ~ t i o n i n ~  of language)), ir itpossible to identzfi certain areas or domains that 
aregoing to be more reievant to this s d y  of the meanin&lfinctioning of langudge? I 
JY In principle any form of knowledge that we can accumulate about lan- 
guage will be relevant for a theory of Pragmatics. If you are defining Pragmatics 
as the study of how language gets used, any knowledge about language is part 
of the knowledge you need. But to come to the point of your question, what 
you do need, first and foremost, is a clearer definition of what this functional 
perspective is like. In order to define it 1 think it is always very useful to start 
with seemingly simple questions. Think for a moment about what it means 
for people to be using language. What are you doing when you are using lan- 
guage? This is a very general kind of question and it is basic to the whole enter- 
prise. 1 think that in order to use such a general question as a starting point 
we also have to abandon shame in connection with giving trivial answers. A 
trivial answer to that general question is that when people use language what 
they are doing is making al1 kinds of linguistic choices for al1 kinds of reasons 
and at al1 levels of linguistic structure. The basic process is a process of choice 
making. 
Of course, this is already a little bit misleading. It is misleading, first of all, 
because it seems to imply that the only thing we are looking at is what the 
producer of the utterance is doing, which is wrong. Interpreting is also making 
choices. That is a very important thing we have to realize. The second mis- 
leading aspect about making choices is associated with choices as conscious 
actions. That is an idea that we have to abandon too. With these two caveats 
we can use it as a starting point for thinking about the use of language. 
Q Couldyou peczfi firtber whatyou mean by ((making choices»? 
TV: This entire idea of the making of choices is something that is very strong 
in Firthian linguistics.8 This gives us an immediate link with another kind of 
tradition that is functionally oriented. It is not an isolated kind of idea. The pro- 
blem with the making of choices is understanding what this is supposed to 
mean. We will need to make reference to a few concepts for that. If you talk 
about the making of choices this has to be choices made from a variable range 
of possibilities. That is where the entire notion of variability becomes central 
8. J. R. Firth was a British linguist (1890-1960) who ernphasized the importance of social 
context for a theory of rneaning. Firth is also responsible for the view that patterns of lan- 
guage use cannot be accounted for in terms of a single systern of analytical principles and 
categories. The ideas of Firth have been followed up by another British linguist, M.A.K. 
Halliday. 
132 Links & Letters 3, 1996 Melissa G. Moyer 
to Pragmatics. We really have to realize that there is an enormous amount of 
variability. There are many different kinds of choices that are being made (e.g., 
e 
choosing a language, a style, syntactic structures, lexical meanings, etc.). Choices 
are not being made once and for all, they are negotiable. Negotiability becomes 
a second very important notion for understanding this making of choices. 
This notion implies that choices are not made mechanically or according to 
strict rules or fixed form-function relat i~nshi~s,  but on the basis of highly 
flexible principles and strategies. Once you have made a linguistic choice, that 
is not the end of it. Not even on the interpreting side, because any interpretation 
can be used to tenegotiate earlier aspects of an interaction (including earlier 
interpretations). The question is, then, how it is still possible for human beings 
to communicate. How can they still communicate if al1 &ey are doing is making 
choices from an enormously variable range of possibilities with values that are 
even negotiable rather than fixed? 
There is a third concept that does not provide an explanation for that but 
which at least provides a name for the phenomenon; it is the notion of adap- 
tability. This is the property of language which enables human beings to make 
negotiable choices from the variable range of possibilities in such a way as to 
satisfy basic human communicative needs. You have to assume that language is 
an extremely adaptable kind of instrument. It fulfills certain communicative 
needs though it is an instrument that itself is enormously variable although 
the variable elements do not have fixed values. You are really dealing with a 
truly adaptable kind of phenomena which again has two sides to it. One might 
assume that al1 that is happening is simply that a speaker assesses a situation, 
makes the linguistic choices that are best adapted to the situation and then 
that is it. Of course, it is not that simple. It is a phenomenon that you have 
to really describe in terms of interadaptability. The choices you make also de- 
fine the situation. A very simple example is for instance the choice of forms 
of address. If you statt to address someone you do not know very well with 
an informal form of address, that defines a situation. If you realize later that this 
is a person who you could never be on familiar terms with, you can not go 
back to formal forms of address without overt hostility. Working then from 
this kind of general notion you can develop some sort of paradigm in terms 
of which you can approach linguistic phenomena from a pragmatic perspective. 
Q What are the more specz$c kinds of questions we have to deal with ifwe 
want to describe some sort of linguistic phenomenon fiom a pragmatic point of 
view? 
JV: There are four very important questions that have to be asked. 
Remember that we are dealing with interadaptability between language and 
al1 kinds of other things. These ((other things* can be anything that is an ingre- 
dient of the speech event, ranging from very wide socio-cultural circumstances 
to individual intentions, beliefs, desires, and so forth, al1 kinds of ingredients 
of the speech event that you can label contextual objects of adaptability. One 
thing that you have to be clear about in dealing with any linguistic pheno- 
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mena from a pragmatic point of view is which are the objects of adaptability 
or objects of interadaptability. This is one question that you have to be able to 
answer ultimately. 
A second kind of question you have to be able to answer is at what struc- 
tural Iayer phenomena have to be situated, 1 mean at what layer of linguistic 
structure. You are rarely dealing with everything at the same time. You can try 
but it is not going to work very well. If you have a specific research question, 
you have to identifj the level at which the phenomena you are studying are 
situated, even though you cannot just isolate these phenomena from other 
levels of structure. If you can identifj the contextual objects of adaptability 
and the structural layers of adaptability, then what you have achieved is a 
description of the locus of the phenomena, namely, the extra-linguistic and 
linguistic coordinates for the phenomena being investigated. 
The main task of course is to deal with the dynamics of the processes in- 
volved. The notion of negotiability implies that there is an enormous amount of 
dynamics involved: the dynamics of meaning construction, and the negotiation 
of meaning. Just take a seemingly simple sentence such as I a m  nota racist. It 
is obvious that an utterance of this kind is embedded in a wider context which 
might lead to a conclusion which the speaker feels compelled to prevent or 
deny. But since the context might lead to such a conclusion, the denial does not 
simply use the pre-existent concept racist but it constitutes one step in the 
negotiation of the meaning of the word. This is what was meant in the begin- 
ning about the meaninaful functioning of language. Ultimately, meaning is 
what language use is al1 about. Pragmatics tries to understand the different 
ways meaning is created. 
There is a fourth question that you can not avoid. You are dealing with 
things that go on in the mind. Some of these processes take place at a high 
level of consciousness but many of them mainly take place at low levels of 
awareness. This is extremely relevant because it allows you to situate various 
types of explicit and implicit meaning. Also implicit meaning can in some 
cases be very consciously constructed but you can get forms of implicit mean- 
ing that ultimately contradict what people would be willing to say that they 
intended to communicate explicitly. Thus, the explicit statement I m  not a 
racist may be completely incompatible with the implications of the surrounding 
d' ~scourse. 
1 think that if you can answer these four types of questions then what you 
have is a decent description of the full functioning of a certain aspect of lan- 
guage. But it is quite a task of course. 
Q: Woulúyou give an example of a piece of research which addresses thesefour 
questions? 
JV It is almost inevitable that pragmatic research consider these four ques- 
tions. But it is necessary to be as explicit about them as possible to avoid many 
implicit assumptions that may obscure the relevance of the research results. 1 
will start out with a very simple kind of example. The context is a flight from 
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Brussels to Frankfurt on an occasion where there was fog, resulting in a delay. 
After a while the plane can take off and the pilot explains to the passengers 
what is happening. Then he says: Once we are in the air we willfly a f a t  mpos- 
sible. The passengers start giggling and you start asking yourself why. Obviously, 
something quite dynarnic must have been going on there because this pilot is very 
serious. He makes this announcement with the most serious voice that you can 
imagine. His words were just intended to reassure the passengers that every 
effort would be made to avoid any further delay. This was meant informa- 
tively. There is no mistake about the pilot's intentions, which did not include 
a humorous effect. So, there must be some surplus meaning that comes up. 
That is an extremely dynamic process that you have to address somehow. 
You have to describe certain elements in the context, the contextual objects of 
adaptability. One of the elements of the context you have to keep in mind and 
that is very crucial is the fact that the context of the pilot is one that is fun- 
darnentally different from the context of the passengers. In the context of the 
pilot in the cockpit, the pilot is dealing with speed in the air on a day-to-day 
basis. For the passengers there is no experiential basis for thinking about speed 
in the air except maybe on some very long flights. There are two different con- 
texts involved. This may already provide one element of the explanation for 
how the extra meaning gets generated. But that is not sufficient because you 
simply have to use some standard linguistic substitution test to show that the 
pilot could have communicated this intended meaning with sentences that 
would not have resulted in the same type of reaction. For instance, the pilot 
could have said something like: Once we are in the air we will ty to make upfor 
some of the delay. If he had said something like that it probably would have 
been received as a simple piece of information. That means that there was already 
something in the form of the expression in itself that must be responsible for 
the process that you observe. 
Then you can start thinking about what it is in the utterance that carries the 
potential of producing this special effect. Of course, you would need a lot of 
comparative material to have any certainty about this. One of the elements 
that definitely is involved is the fact that normally a verb such as tofly, in its non- 
metaphorical sense, is a verb that has non-human agents. And if you have a 
human agent, which is possible, you expect some focus on the airplane. If you 
start to underscore human agency as such by describing a manner of flying 
(such as, as fmt aspossible) then you get something that is slightly deviant from 
the expected pattern of usage. Breaking such expectations evokes al1 kinds of 
images in people's minds like, for instance, the image of a German driving a 
BMW or a Mercedes on a highway without speed restrictions which is an 
image that does not fit an airline pilot. Then you can start to ask the question 
of how much of this takes place on a conscious level. The pilot quite con- 
sciously chose his words, but maybe he is too clumsy at using the right idio- 
matic expressions to avoid this type of generation of additional meaning. His 
seriousness suggests that the choices were not made to achieve one of the effects 
produced by his words. 
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Al1 these elements can be shown to be involved in a small simple example 
of this kind. They get al1 the more complicated in interaction with real ex- 
changes, such as regular conversation. 
Q How has Pragmatics evolved? What contributions have been made in recent 
years in thejeld of Pragmatics? How has Pragmatics advanced, let? say, since 
Speech Act Theory? 
JV: The more general form of the questions you are asking is difficult to 
answer because you do not get something you can really describe as some sort 
of major new development. There are al1 sorts of different strands that inter- 
sect in various ways and sometimes just run parallel to each other. Focusing 
on the more specific aspects of the question (what kinds of things in recent 
years are of particular importance to reach an understanding of the Pragmatics 
of language), there are two things that are of crucial importance. 
First of all, there is a development in connection to the notion of context. 
Remembering what 1 said about identiGing contextual objects of adaptability 
as one of the necessary questions for pragmatic investigations you will see why 
1 regard context as very crucial. The most important recent achievement is the 
realization that context in itself is not just something that is out there in the 
world that is separate from language and that simply has to be referred to and 
used as a proper motivation for making appropriate linguistic choices. What 
is important is the realization that a context itself is something that is in- 
teractively constructed. This realization makes it easier to use the notion of 
context to study forms of language use. If you do not realize that the process 
really involves the interactive construction of context, then what you are deal- 
ing with is this completely indiscriminate world of anything that can be relevant 
to language. That is one of the reasons why many linguists have been very 
hesitant to rely on this notion. It becomes a reality you cannot manage. 
What the newer developments with respect to the notion of context do is 
to allow you to trace in a discourse or in a convei.sation the way in which 
aspects of this wide context are actually used for purposes of making produc- 
tion choices or interpretation choices. You can trace in language those ele- 
ments that are actually getting used, and there is no need to talk about elements 
that are not getting used. That makes it much easier then to be really empiri- 
cal in Pragmatics. 
1 want to link this to another notion where there are developments that 1 
think are very important, in particular, a development in connection to the 
notion of meaning in context. If you think about Grice, and Gricean rules, 
what Grice did was something you could describe as removing meaning from 
language by saying that meaning is not just there in language f ~ r m s . ~  Meaning 
is something to be situated. Though he accepted the existence of conventional 
9. H.P. Grice was a philosopher who developed the theory of conversational implicatures that 
refers to the implications that can be deduced from the form of an utterance on the basis 
of cooperative principies that account for the efficiency and acceptability of conversations. 
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forms of meaning, he drew attention to speaker meaning or utterer meaning. 
What he did, as a result, was to locate meaning in the language user. This is fun- 
damentally pragmatic. If you remember Charles Morris defined Pragmatics as 
the study of the relationship between signs and their users.1° Once you start 
removing meaning from language you are in for some risky business, because 
you open up an entire world of potential speculation. What Grice did, there- 
fore, was to restrict the extra-linguistic domain in relation to which he wanted 
to define meaning. He did that by locating it not with the utterer as such, but 
only with the utterer's intentions. It is for this reason that he says you have to 
deal with intended meaning (intended meaning used reflexively, because what 
we are dealing with is a process in which the utterer intends the interpreten 
to recognize the speaker's intentions). By restricting meaning to pure inten- 
tionality he is leaving out an enormous amount of things that are relevant. 
Ultimately, what we have to do is something that is much more risky than 
what Grice did, if we really want to take a look at meaning in its full human 
complexity with al1 the functionality involved. 
The example 1 just gave about the airplane pilot is illustrative. The mea- 
ning generated on that occasion is something that was not fully determined 
by what was intended by the speaker and this is pretty obvious. There are 
various forms of meaning not directly intended. You have to cope with many 
other things as well. Then, of course, the big problem is how to keep Pragmatics 
manageable. That is where it becomes so extremely important to be very strict 
in terms of methodology. In a way, what we are doing is to remove meaning even 
further from language. Then what we have to do is re-attach it methodologically 
to somehow keep what we are doing empirical. That is the big challenge. 
These are reasons why 1 am happy with developments in connection with 
the notion of context. The way in which context is being thought about now 
in terms of this interactive construction allows us to re-attach meaning to lan- 
guage. We need to look very carefully at the language material that we have 
there. Of course, this includes al1 kinds of extra-linguistic things, such as ges- 
tures and gaze. But you have to look at the empirical material and see what 
elements of context are actually getting used. 
Q Another question that comes up specially in relation to context is the role 
«contextuali.zation cues» play in generating meanings. 
JV: The notion of contextualization cue as it was used by Gumperz and 
other people in interactional sociolinguistics gives me an opportunity to link 
al1 that again to the framework 1 was talking about." Because what is available 
10. Charles Morris provided one of the first definitions of Pragmatics. He considered it a branch 
of semiotics, where serniosis is taken to mean the process in which something functions as 
a sign. His article Foundations ofthe tbeo y ofsigns was published in 1938 in a volume edi- 
ted by O. Neurath, R. Carnap, and C. Morris. New York: Academic Press. 
11. The creation, maintenance and change in a context rely on cues which operate primarily at 
several different levels of speech production; namely, prosody (intonation, stress or ac- 
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as a contextualization cue usually has a low degree of saliente. People are not 
very much aware of them most of the time. Contextualization cues are usually 
restricted to less salient elements or less salient ways of using context in the 
shared production of meaning. 
Q Code-switching is a kind of «contextualization me», and it is something 
that can be quite salient, but what is being communicated by a code-switch that 
is not always salient? 
JV: Code-switches, like most other types of contextualization cues, are very 
implicit ways of expressing meaning, and very often meaning that is not cons- 
ciously intended. They do play a very important role in the on-going process 
and that is something you can observe as an outsider. The way 1 have always 
conceptualized contextualization cues is as being situated on one end of a scale 
with al1 kinds of elements in language that bind the language to context, the 
end at which the less conscious processes are located. 1 do not see them as 
more important than other elements. They may play a more important role 
in certain forms of rni~understandin~s because most of the time they are ra- 
ther automatic and less conscious. If you see that there are very different rhetorical 
traditions related to certain types of contextualization cues and if what happens 
there is at a very low leve1 of consciousness, then the potential of misinter- 
pretation they generate is enormous. In that sense, code-switching plays a more 
important role in discussions of intercultural communication. But in them- 
selves contextualization cues do not have to be more important. In certain con- 
texts they may become more important because they can have more 
consequences. 
Q You mentioned earlier the need to use a certain method in Prapatics. 
Couldyou expkin what this method consists in? 
JV: The overriding principle is to make sure that what we do remains as 
empirical as posible. This does not make the task any easier because we al1 
know what that means. Empirical research consumes a lot of time and energy. 
Let me answer your question with reference to the type of research 1 have been 
deeply involved in for the 1 s t  few years. That is research related to ideology, 
societal ideologies as you can find them in various types of discourse, in this case 
particularly discourse here in Belgium about the presence of foreipers in 
Belgian society. 
The way the research was conducted is the following. What we looked at 
was rhetoric not coming from any extremist groups because we think that is vir- 
tually uninteresting (well, maybe interesting to look at, but it would not offer 
any surprises). Discourse coming from extremist groups is explicit about what 
centing), pardinguistic signs (tempo, pausing, hesitation, overlapping), code choice, and 
general choices of lexicd forms or formulaic expressions. For more information on contextu- 
alization cues see J. Gurnperz (1992) Contextzlalization and understanding. In A. Duranti, 
and C. Goodwin (eds.) Rethinking Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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it means. It is much more interesting to start looking at discourse coming from 
an average member of the society who in connection with this kind of dispute 
views him or herself as tolerant, so in this case, the discourse of the tolerant 
majority. We looked at various types of discourse: not only news-reports, but 
also discourse coming from political parties, policy statements, the discourse 
used in training programs set up by a government service for police officers 
who have to deal with minorities, and the discourse that you find in social 
scientific research reports, or at least the ones that get widely distributed. You 
look at al1 these data and you know that what you are going to find at an expli- 
cit level is an attitude of openness towards foreigners. What you do then 
is you start looking ~~stematically at the implicit forms of meaning that are 
related to how diversity in society is perceived. You do this at different levels of 
structure: you look at patterns of word choice but also at al1 kinds of presup- 
positions, implication-carrying constructions, interaction patterns, and pat- 
terns of argumentation. 
The general conclusion you come to in this connection is that there is no 
acceptance of diversity. The model in terms of which the tolerant majority tries 
to deal with the minorities is based on a homogenistic ideolog, that is on the 
idea that the ideal society is a homogeneous society. If homogeneity is per- 
ceived as the normal situation then any type of diversity becomes abnormal. 1 
could give you many ways in which this abnormalization of the foreigner is 
being produced rhetorically. If homogeneity is the norm then you get nega- 
tive reactions to any abnormal situation where you get diversity, reactions like 
racism, xenophobia and so on, and these attitudes becomes normal. You get 
a normalization of racism. In terms of solutions that are being proposed to 
the problems, the tolerant majority can not say what the extreme right says: 
letj take theforeigners out. They cannot say that because they are tolerant and 
open people (sic), and because they perceive themselves as tolerant. The solu- 
tion that is being produced is then frarned in terms of integration where the defi- 
nition of integration boils down to a rehomogenization of society to try to 
make sure there are no fundamental differences. 
The general conclusion was that the level of acceptance of diversity is low. 
If you consider the structure of this kind of research then what linguists find from 
their analysis is a conclusion that contradicts what the people involved would 
want to say about their own attitudes if asked. There is a direct contradiction 
in what they say their intended meaning is and what we find in terms of 
meaning at this very implicit level. What you get there is a complete gap 
benveen on the one hand, what people say their intentions are and, on the 
other hand, what we define in terms of meaning. In such a situation it is impor- 
tant that your research should be very sound from a methodological point of 
view because otherwise you are open to criticisms of pure speculation. 
Q Are there any specz$c meth~dolo~ical considerations one should bear in 
mind when undertaking research in Pragmatics of the type you have just describ- 
ed? 
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JV: There are numerous methodological guidelines that you can use. First 
of all, you have to be very careful to distinguish speculation from legitimate 
forms of intelpretation, and there are ways of doing that. 1 am going to give a 
simple example taken from the standard pragmatic literature about implica- 
tures. 
If 1 go for a job interview and 1 have been waiting for a while, and then 1 
ask the receptionist: couldyou tell me where the bathroom id Then you get the 
entire process of interpretation going. If this person just answered with yes or 
no, that would not be very helpful. The question has to be answered in a dif- 
ferent way. That has al1 been described in the literature. The answer the recep- 
tionist might give, just around the corner, has al1 kinds of implications. She 
assumes that these bathrooms are open and available for use. These are legiti- 
mate aspects of interpretation that you can talk about because they are inter- 
subjectively agreed upon. The receptionist can go further in her interpretation 
and she can think: oh, he: nervous. The product of such speculation may of 
course be accurate. But at that point it is no longer interpretation that you 
can speak about, for instance in terms of Gricean implicatures. This a point 
where interpretation may become speculation. The methodological guideline 
is: whenever in doubt about a certain conclusion you just have to be extremely 
careful. 
There are many additional requirements that you have to keep in mind 
and which amount to the establishment of some sort of coherence in the 
discourse you are analyzing. You can never work with isolated examples. You 
need a serious Corpus to analyze which should be varied in severa1 ways. 
For instance, you should not always study newspaper reports because you can 
not draw general societal conclusions, since what you would find could be 
symptomatic for just that type of communication. If you take different types 
of discourse you have a better empirical basis for what you are saying. In our 
case, newspapers, political policy documents, social scientific research reports, 
and also this training program that was organized for police officers. If we find 
systematic kinds of phenomena in those different types of discourse then we have 
something to go on. 
An additional requirement is that your data also have to be varied in the 
sense that you should never stick to just one level of analysis. If you were to 
do that you could be stuck with the level that is carefully monitored. People 
always monitor their own discourse but we al1 know that it is impossible to 
monitor your own discourse at al1 different levels of structure, at the same 
time. If then you make sure that you conduct your analysis at very different 
levels of structure like patterns of word choice, implication, presupposition, 
interruptions, rhetoric, problems of organization, also interaction patterns, 
and if you find the same sort of phenomena at al1 the different levels and you 
can identify them, then you have something to go on that is empirical. 
Then after al1 the work has been done, there are other things you have to 
do, like for instance something that we cal1 counter-screening. Once you have 
gone through your data, and once you have reached a conclusion, there is a 
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risk that you have been pided by the things you thought that you would find 
from the very beginning when you started the investigation. It may be the 
case that you systematically started looking for the same types of phenomena 
throughout the materials. What you have to do then is to take the opposite 
of your conclusion. Go through the materials again and try to find evidence for 
the opposite. Al1 these kinds of things make serious pragmatic research quite 
intensive and complicated and very time-consuming. But it is necessary to 
take these methodological points into account. 
Q Do you have any&rther recommendation to make? 
JV: For my own protection: when reading this interview, please keep in 
mind the restrictions of the genre. In other words, whatever 1 have said should 
be approached pragmatically. 
